This paper exploits the substantial degree of cross-place variation in urban renewal activity to estimate the program's effects on city-level economic outcomes. It makes four main advances toward a better understanding of the program's effects. First, because cities planned and undertook the projects, selection issues are likely to confound ordinary least squares estimates; therefore, our empirical strategy features an instrumental variable that legally constrained cities' ability to participate in the program. Second, we compile and examine a new dataset for all cities with more than 25,000 residents in 1950 and 1980, thereby spanning the entire period during which the program operated and the recipients of the vast majority of urban renewal funding. Since urban renewal projects often took several years to plan and execute, spanning the full period is important. Third, to the extent that urban renewal appears to have had effects on city-level outcomes, we examine whether such effects worked primarily through the displacement of residents with relatively low levels of human capital (i.e., changes in population composition) or, alternatively, through channels consistent with economic growth. Fourth, we directly assess whether the urban renewal program systematically affected the degree of residential segregation in central cities and African Americans' labor market and housing outcomes. Such claims are common in the literature about urban renewal, but they are anecdotal and rarely formulated with a counterfactual outcome in mind.
The results suggest a less dismal legacy for the U.S. urban renewal program than is commonly portrayed. It appears that cities that were allowed to engage more actively in urban renewal posted better outcomes in 1980 than they otherwise would have in terms of property value, income, and population growth. These results were not achieved by merely pushing residents with low human capital levels out of the city. Moreover, we do not find evidence that urban renewal exacerbated residential segregation or negatively affected African Americans' population size, labor market outcomes, or housing outcomes. The results do not imply that Title I was the best way to provide aid to central cities by any criterion (economic or otherwise), nor do they imply that the dislocation costs for displaced residents and businesses were unimportant. 5 In fact, these costs and their perceived unfairness were fundamental to the program's demise.
effects from Richmond's "Neighborhoods in Bloom" program, which, like urban renewal, targeted specific areas for concentrated program interventions. 5 A full cost-benefit analysis of the program is beyond the scope of this paper. See Rothenberg (1967) for a discussion of the difficulties such an undertaking would entail. Glaeser and Gottlieb (2008) address the potential pitfalls of public policies that target specific places.
Background

A Brief History
In the aftermath of the Great Depression and World War II, housing issues rose to the top of the domestic policy agenda, and the elimination of slums and redevelopment of central cities became prominent objectives (Gelfand 1975 , Teaford 1990 , Fogelson 2001 . In 1940, the Urban Land Institute, which was closely connected to the National Association of Real Estate Boards, began publishing city-specific studies that recommended areas for redevelopment (Weiss 1980) .
As early as 1941, the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) and economists Guy Greer and
Alvin Hansen published plans for federally-aided slum clearance and urban redevelopment with many similarities to subsequent legislative initiatives (Foard and Fefferman 1960) . Proponents of urban renewal believed that blight was rooted in powerful externalities and was therefore "contagious." They also argued that transaction costs inhibited the effective assembly and redevelopment of land in central cities by private enterprise, that city governments had neither the legal nor the financial resources to undertake large-scale clearance and renewal efforts, and that the problems associated with slums extended beyond city boundaries (Slayton 1966) .
Under Title I of the Housing Act of 1949, Congress authorized the Housing and Home
Finance Agency (HHFA) to assist locally planned urban renewal projects with grants of twothirds (or in some cases four-fifths) of the net project cost, where the net cost was defined as the difference between the total cost of acquiring and clearing properties and the income received from re-selling the cleared land. The original 1949 Act emphasized slum clearance and redevelopment of a "predominantly residential" character, but subsequent legislation widened the program's scope to include more rehabilitation and conservation efforts, made exceptions for projects that were not predominantly residential (including hospital and university expansions), and added emphasis on city-wide planning and code enforcement.
The grant application and project execution processes changed over time, but a typical chronology would start with the creation of a Local Public Agency (LPA) that was "enabled" under state legislation to undertake urban renewal activities and to exercise eminent domain powers. The LPA would identify an "urban renewal area" (characterized by "blight" or signs of deterioration), hold public hearings, seek approval from the local government (e.g., city council), and then seek approval from HHFA (or later HUD) to proceed with specific project planning in that area. The project plans would include detailed information on current and proposed land use, changes in streets and utilities, how displaced residents and businesses would be aided, and estimates of the costs entailed. Once approved, a combination of federal loans and grants would allow the project to proceed. 6 Projects often took several years to complete, and the slow pace of progress was a continual source of frustration.
As of June 30, 1966, the last date on which detailed data are available, approved projects had cleared (or intended to clear) over 400,000 housing units, forcing the relocation of over 300,000 families, just over half of whom were nonwhite. 7 The proposed clearance areas included nearly 57,000 total acres (90 square miles), of which about 35 percent was proposed for residential redevelopment, 27 percent for streets and public rights-of-way, 15 percent for industrial use, 13 percent for commercial use, and 11 percent for public or "semi-public" use (HUD 1966, p. 9 ).
The urban renewal program began with fairly broad political support, but it became increasingly controversial with time. Critics decried the disproportionate impact on poor residents, the use of eminent domain to trump private property rights, the destruction of cohesive neighborhoods, the loss of historic buildings, and the aesthetics of the new structures (Jacobs 1961 , Anderson 1964 , Gans 1965 , Wilson 1966 , and von Hoffman 2000 , Gotham 2001 ).
Although national publications, such as Time Magazine (Nov. 6, 1964) , trumpeted the program's accomplishments well into the 1960s, and proponents responded strongly to the critics and clarified the program's goals and lessons-learned (Groberg 1965 , Abrams 1966 , Slayton 1966 , political support for the program eroded. New funding halted in 1974.
Potential Effects
Once a local urban renewal program was undertaken, how might it have affected citylevel outcomes? The most direct impact would be on the areas targeted for clearance, redevelopment, or rehabilitation. By knocking down relatively low-quality housing and commercial buildings, the left-hand tail of the distribution of building quality might be thinned out, and the means and medians of various city-wide measures might rise mechanically. The 6 This paragraph relies primarily on Slayton (1966) and Groberg (1968) . Also see Foard and Fefferman (1960) and Sogg and Wertheimer (1959) . We proceed as if the supply of grants was essentially elastic for projects that met HHFA or HUD requirements. In fact, funding was subject to Congressional authorization and therefore to year-to-year changes in funding constraints. 7 Approximately 54 percent of the displaced families were nonwhite (HUD 1966 implicit model held by proponents of urban renewal, however, emphasized the role of substantial spillovers within the city. 8 Blight was considered geographically contagious, highly detrimental to the well-being of people living in or near such areas, a growing drain on public resources, and both a cause and consequence of middle-class flight and local governments' fiscal problems. It was argued that reversing the fortunes of specific areas would benefit the city through a virtuous circle (e.g., less blight, less outmigration, and higher property values across the city), or at least by short-circuiting the process of deterioration. In this context, recourse to eminent domain was important because assembling sizable areas of urban land through individual negotiations with multiple property owners was costly and subject to holdouts (Davis and Whinston 1960) . In addition effects emanating from specific projects, the program's emphasis on code enforcement, city-wide planning, and rehabilitation might have had broader impacts (Carey 2001) .
In essence, urban renewal attempted to make central-city locations more attractive to both residents and businesses. In an inter-city spatial equilibrium model with mobile workers and capital and tradable goods, as described by Roback (1982) , a higher level of local amenities that are valued by both workers and firms tends to raise equilibrium property values (because for any given wage level, both workers and firms are willing to pay more rent) and to have an ambiguous effect on wages (because for any given rent level, workers are willing to accept lower wages but firms are willing to pay higher wages). The attraction of firms and workers would tend to increase the city's population, which in the presence of agglomeration economies could amplify effects on local productivity. 9 In an intra-city model that features externalities in property upkeep, Schall (1976) shows that renewal-like efforts to raise local housing quality may be unsustainable when the competitive equilibrium is at a relatively low level of quality, in which case targeted local improvements have short-lived effects. But the possibility of multiple equilibria in Schall's model does allow scope for a sustained, positive urban renewal effect.
Whether the urban renewal program actually had economically significant effects on American Glaeser (2008) and Albouy (2010) for recent extensions and applications of the Roback model.
Empirical Strategy and the Distribution of Urban Renewal Funds
Data and Framework
The goals of Title I were broad and predicated on the belief that targeted improvements within a city could have positive effects for the city as a whole. Because the goals and hypothesized effects were city-wide in scope and because the program was carried out by city governments, we examine the link between urban renewal activity and city-level economic outcomes reported in the 1980 Census of Population and Housing. 10 We collected information on urban renewal activity from the Department of Housing and Urban Development's Urban Renewal Directory, which was last published in 1974. For each project in each city, the Directory lists the value of federal grants approved and disbursed up to the publication date.
This city-level sum includes both urban renewal projects and funds for smaller initiatives that were added under the urban renewal programs umbrella. The close connection between federal funding and urban renewal expenditure ensures that variation across cities in the volume of federal grants is a reliable indicator of variation in urban renewal activity. We scale the "grants approved" figure by the population of each city in 1950, and all regressions control for cityspecific characteristics that might confound the interpretation of differences in grant levels across cities (e.g., pre-existing differences in property values). The instrumental-variable strategy, discussed below, addresses concerns regarding the endogeneity of funding and measurement error in the true intensity of urban renewal activity.
The central empirical question in this paper is whether more intensive urban renewal programs (UR ij , where i represents the city and j the census division) led to noticeably better economic outcomes in 1980 (Y ij80 ), conditional on each city's economic and population characteristics at the time of the federal program's implementation (X ij50 ) and eight censusdivision indicator variables (δ j ). That is, do estimates of β 1 in equation 1 suggest a favorable effect of urban renewal efforts?
(1)
The main outcome variables of interest are the log of median family income, the log of median value of owner occupied property, the employment rate, and the poverty rate. Subsequent 10 Detailed city-specific case studies would be a valuable complement to this paper's analysis. See White (1980) for an example; unfortunately, the study's underlying project-location data could not be recovered (personal communication with author). Our search at the National Archives and inquiries to HUD did not uncover a systematic collection of city-specific plans, and so the scope for this approach might be limited.
analyses examine additional outcomes, including population and housing stock variables. The extensive set of pre-program control variables (X) includes: housing stock characteristics in 1950 (the percentage of housing units built before 1920, the percentage that were dilapidated, the percentage that lacked indoor plumbing, the percentage that were crowded, the percentage that were owner-occupied, and the log median value of owner-occupied units); population characteristics in 1950 (the nonwhite percentage of the population, median educational attainment of those over age 24, and the log of the city's total population); and economic characteristics in 1950 (log median family income, the employment rate, the percentage of employment in manufacturing, and the percentage of families with income below $2,000 [a proxy for poverty]). The list of control variables always includes the 1950 value of the outcome variable. Summary statistics are in appendix table 1. Sources are described in the data appendix.
The main econometric problem in interpreting an estimate of β 1 as a program effect is that urban renewal projects were initiated, planned, and carried out at the local level. Even with a rich set of city-level control variables and census-division indicators, unobservable city-level differences may be correlated with both the intensity of program participation and subsequent economic outcomes. Cities that were deteriorating relative to others in ways that are not captured by the control variables might have pursued a large volume of urban renewal projects; such cities might have ended up with worse economic outcomes than other cities in 1980 but with better outcomes than if they had gone without the funding (the OLS coefficient on funding would understate the true impact of UR funding). Or the opposite case could hold: cities with profitable opportunities might have enthusiastically pursued urban renewal projects. Such places might have posted relatively strong outcomes in 1980 even if the renewal program had no effect.
We address this problem by finding plausibly exogenous variation in cities' urban renewal funding that is due to differences in the timing of state-enacted enabling legislation.
Enabling legislation permitted and set legal parameters for the creation of local public agencies (LPAs) that could exercise eminent domain to acquire property for private redevelopment, a prerequisite to undertaking urban renewal projects. This legislation was crucial to the implementation of federally funded urban renewal projects and is often cited in the early social science literature that considers cross-city differences in funding (e.g., Straits 1965 , Plott 1968 , and Bingham 1975 , in historical accounts of urban renewal initiatives (e.g., Teaford 1990 , Fairbanks 2002 , 2006 , in considerations of the program's legal aspects (e.g., Sogg and Wertheimer 1959, Pritchett 2003) , and in urban planning publications (e.g., see Greer and Hansen 1941 Bingham (1975, p. 84) reports that later enabling legislation tended to be more restrictive in terms of requirements for referenda on urban renewal programs and projects. 13 Fairbanks (2006) goes on to note that although representatives from Dallas, Fort Worth, and San Antonio pushed for the state-enabling legislation, representatives from rural areas and various industry groups (e.g., Texas Real Estate Board and Texas Association of Home Builders) worked to defeat it. cities since it halted implementation of the program in the state and allowed opponents of urban renewal to organize an effective lobby" (2002, p. 186) .
In Georgia, South Carolina, and Florida, rulings by state courts forestalled and curtailed the implementation of urban renewal programs. Whereas other state courts interpreted the "public use" qualification for eminent domain fairly broadly when assessing the program's validity, specifically allowing for private redevelopment under Title I, the courts in these three states did not. Later in the paper, we test whether an IV based solely on these judicial decisions confirms the basic results that are based on differences in the timing of effective legislation.
If delays of enabling legislation (1) affected city-level urban renewal participation, (2) did not influence city-level outcomes in 1980 through other channels, and (3) are not correlated with unobserved factors that did influence outcomes in 1980, then the timing of enabling laws may serve as a credible instrumental variable for urban renewal funding.
14 In the paper's next subsection, we focus on examining the first condition-whether enabling legislation affected city-level funding levels. The specific nature of the enabling legislation makes it unlikely to have influenced 1980 outcomes through channels other than program participation (condition 2).
Potential confounding relationships (condition 3), such as contemporaneous social and urban programs, secular economic trends, differences in political conservatism, and relevant state policies are assessed in section 3. Table 1 reports ordinary-least-squares regression estimates of equation 2, where UR ij is urban renewal funding per capita (in city i and census division j) and L ij is each city's "years of potential participation" in the federal urban renewal program (defined as the difference between 1974 and the year in which enabling legislation was passed).
Urban Renewal Funding
(2)
Similar to equation 1, X is a set of city-level characteristics in 1950, and λ is a set of censusdivision fixed effects (states are grouped in to nine census divisions). For consistency with the IV regressions that follow, we use a sample of 458 cities with populations of at least 25,000 in 14 In our main analysis, we use the timing of legislation as reported in Aiken and Alford (1972) . This maintains consistency with earlier studies and assures readers that judgment calls in coding have not been influenced by our intention to use the laws in subsequent IV regressions.
1950 and 1980 without missing data on outcome or control variables.
15 If enabling legislation constrained cities' ability to plan, apply for, and receive federal grants, then estimates of τ 1 should be positive. 17 The correlation between funding and enabling legislation also remains strong when omitting cities with over 500,000 residents or the largest city in each state, or when dropping each census division from the sample in turn. Thus, the first-stage correlation reported in table 1, column 2, is not driven by otherwise unobserved differences in political orientation, willingness or ability to tax, cross-state income differences, the sample's most powerful cities, or an idiosyncratic census division.
In summary, legal requirements, historical studies, and archival information indicate that the timing of state enabling legislation constrained cities' ability to participate in the urban 15 The population threshold reflects the availability of city-level census data in Haines (2004) . 16 Tobit regressions also suggest strong and statistically significant correlations. We focus on OLS results for consistency with the first-stage regressions of the IV estimates that follow. 17 Goldwater opposed urban renewal programs, and 1964 was the first year the Republican Party's platform criticized urban renewal, so this is a relevant gauge of local conservatism. Nate Baum-Snow kindly supplied highway data from his paper on suburbanization (2007). We lose almost half of the sample when controlling for the change in central-city federal highway miles, but in the reduced sample estimates of τ 1 are similar with and without the highway control variable (12.6 compared to 12.8).
renewal program. Delays in access to the program apparently narrowed the window of opportunity for planning, funding, and carrying out urban renewal projects. This interpretation is supported statistically by a strong link between the quantity of local urban renewal funding and the timing of state legislation, even when controlling for many relevant, observable city characteristics. The first-stage regression results are consistent with a pattern of quasi-random assignment of enabling legislation across cities within census divisions. We further explore the instrument's validity below.
Urban Renewal Effects
Basic Results
We estimate the effect of urban renewal programs in equation 1 by instrumenting for funding (UR) with the timing of enabling legislation (L). In all the regressions we include the set of city-level control variables (X ij50 ) described above, as well as census-division dummy variables. The implicit first-stage regression results are the same as those in table 1, column 2.
The F-statistic for the instrumental variable in the first-stage regression is 13.1, a fairly strong relationship that should mitigate biases associated with weak instruments (Bound, Jaeger, and Baker 1995; Staiger and Stock 1997; Stock, Wright, and Yogo 2002) and with deviations from the assumed exclusion restriction (Conley, Hansen, and Rossi 2008) .
The base-specification estimates of β 1 are reported in row 1 of table 2, where each table   entry is from a separate regression. The results suggest that urban renewal programs led to higher median income and higher median property values in 1980 at a 5 percent level of statistical significance. The estimated effects on the employment rate and percentage of families in poverty are less precisely estimated, but they are consistent with favorable effects.
For a program that is widely held in low regard, the basic results in table 2 are striking: a $100 per capita difference in grant funding is associated with a 2.6 percent difference in 1980 median income and a 7.7 percent difference in 1980 median property value. The median city in our dataset received $122 per capita in funding, and so the coefficient estimates imply an economically significant impact. Because total investment (a combination of private and public resources) in the wake of federal urban renewal funding is an unknown multiple of the federal grant and because these resources might have been invested elsewhere in the absence of urban renewal programs (e.g., more suburban development), the coefficients from these city-level regressions should be interpreted with care. They are not estimates of the social returns on investment or local fiscal multipliers. In reduced-form regressions (of Y on L, controls, and census division fixed effects), an extra 5 years of enabling legislation is associated with a 4.3 percent relative rise in property values and 1.4 percent relative rise in median family income.
The coefficient on L is significant at the 1 percent level in both regressions.
The IV regression results are substantially more positive than comparable OLS results, which are reported in appendix table 2. 18 Assuming for now that the instrument is valid, this suggests that urban renewal funding was correlated with unobserved negative shocks or trends, which lowers the OLS estimates of urban renewal effects.
Robustness to Additional Controls
We first consider scenarios in which the basic estimates of urban renewal effects might be confounded by omitted variables. Essentially, these are circumstances under which the instrument is hypothetically correlated with the error term in equation 1 (violating "condition 3" described above). Later, we test the sensitivity of the results to a substantial recoding of the enabling legislation instrumental variable and to using an instrumental variable that is based on state court rulings that delayed program participation.
First, it is possible that government programs that were coincident with urban renewal influenced city-level outcomes. If participation in these programs were uncorrelated with the timing of state-enabling legislation for urban renewal, then the IV estimates would still be valid.
But since some programs were related to urban renewal (e.g., established in related legislation or Second, variation in participation in public housing, Model Cities, and other programs raises a distinct and potentially confounding issue-the unobservable quality of local 18 The null hypothesis of exogenous urban renewal funding is rejected at the 5 percent level in the regressions for income, property value, and employment rate.
government. High-quality local governments might be more adept at applying for federal grants, getting the necessary enabling legislation passed, and carrying out other functions that affect city-level outcomes. This interpretation seems inconsistent with the results in row 2, at least to the extent that participation in public housing and Model Cities proxy for local government initiative or administrative capability. It also seems inconsistent with the OLS results, where one might expect to see a positive link between outcomes and urban renewal funding if good local governments were coincidentally good grant writers and effective lobbyists. We have undertaken additional investigation of the government-quality hypothesis by collecting Moody's city bond ratings for 1950 (Porter 1950) . The ratings should reflect forward-looking views of cities' fiscal soundness, which in turn depend on the quality of local management and underlying economic prospects. Not all cities had ratings available, and we assigned cities to one of three categories for analysis: relatively high ratings (Aaa to A ratings), relatively low ratings (Baa and below), and "rating not available." The results are similar to those in row 1. 19 We have uncovered no evidence that the quality or characteristics of local government drive the results.
Third, it is possible that differences in the timing of state enabling legislation are correlated with cross-state differences in support for cities. and 1980 (Bartik 1991 ), which we constructed using information from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS, Ruggles et al. 2008) . 21 The census division controls should capture much of the secular rise of the "sunbelt," but we have also included a control variable for mean January temperature which others have found to be a strong predictor of city growth in this period (Glaeser and Tobio 2008) . The results are reported in row 4 of table 2 and are similar to the base results in row 1.
Finally, we dropped the largest city in each state from the sample and re-ran the basic IV regressions. This leaves us with a sample of cities within each state that are less politically influential and more likely to find the timing of enabling legislation exogenous to their circumstances and demands. The results are reported in row 5. They are similar to the base results, and in most cases are marginally stronger in magnitude and statistical significance.
None of the robustness checks above suggests that the basic results are driven by omitted factors that are correlated with the instrument and influence the outcomes of interest directly (condition 3). Although it is not possible to completely rule out contamination from unobservable shocks that are correlated with the instrument, such shocks would have to operate differentially across cities within census divisions in a manner that is not captured by the extensive set of base-specification control variables and the subsequent robustness checks.
Robustness to Changing Instruments
We start by replacing the original instrumental variable based on the timing of enabling legislation with two alternative codings. 
Rural Counties and the Instrumental Variable
If the timing of state enabling legislation for urban renewal strongly predicted property values, income, employment, poverty, and population growth in rural areas, it would suggest that the main instrumental variable is correlated with unobserved determinants of economic outcomes, and therefore an invalid basis for making causal inferences (assuming that positive spillovers from urban renewal are not strongly felt in rural areas). To investigate this possibility, we constructed a dataset of rural counties using Haines (2004) . Table 3 outcomes in rural counties. 25 The rural county estimates never approach statistical significance, and they are often small and have the opposite sign relative to the city-level results.
Channels of Influence
If the urban renewal program affected city-level economic outcomes, as suggested above, how were these results achieved? As mentioned earlier, one can imagine urban renewal's effect on city-level variables working through a narrow, mechanical, and perhaps even perverse channel-essentially lopping off the left-hand tail of the housing-quality distribution and driving people with low levels of human capital and earnings out of the city. We will refer to this as the "displacement channel," which works by altering the composition of the city's population. Of course, a mechanism that merely displaces the poor from the city is quite different from the mechanism touted by proponents of urban renewal, who argued that it could impart a virtuous circle of renewal and growth, or at least dampen an ongoing circle of deterioration. For short, we will refer to this as the "renewal and growth channel." These two channels of influence are not mutually exclusive. Displacement of the poor, for example, could occur as a byproduct of rising property values, which in turn are anchored by gains in local amenities or productivity.
We shed light on these issues in two ways. First, in IV regressions that are similar to those above, we directly examine whether urban renewal funding affected city-level proxies for the "displacement" or "renewal and growth" channels (table 4) . Then, to see if the basic results in table 2 are driven (partially or wholly) by changes in population characteristics, as the displacement hypothesis would suggest, we add control variables for potentially endogenous population characteristics (observed in 1980) to the base regressions from table 2. If the displacement channel were the primary means by which urban renewal affected outcomes, we would expect to see a sharp diminution of the point estimates on urban renewal funding (table 5) .
The first two columns of table 4 estimate the effect of urban renewal on the median schooling level of the adult population and the black percentage of the population. If urban renewal worked by disproportionately displacing from the city those with low levels of human capital or minority residents, one would expect the urban renewal coefficient in the schooling regression to be strongly positive or the coefficient in the black-share-of-population regression to be strongly negative. We find no support for these hypotheses. The estimated effect on schooling is small and imprecise, and there is no reduction in the black population (the point estimate is positive), even though black residents were disproportionately displaced from renewal areas within cities.
26
The next four columns of table 4 assess aspects of the "renewal and growth" channel.
The last two columns, under "City Growth," report estimates of the urban renewal effect on the overall size of the population and housing stock in 1980, controlling for their size in 1950, changes in land area, and the base set of 1950 control variables (X). The estimates suggest that the urban renewal positively affected city population and housing units; a $100 per capita increase in urban renewal funding is associated with about a 9 percent increase in population and housing in the base specifications. The point estimates are notably smaller, however, when only the court reversal instrument is used (row 8). In the middle two columns, under "Housing Stock
Characteristics," urban renewal is associated with a lower proportion of old housing units in 1980 (i.e., units built before 1940). The coefficient suggests that an additional $100 per capita in funding decreased the share of old housing by 3 percentage points. The estimate of the effect on the percentage of units without full plumbing is also negative, but it is relatively imprecise. 27 The weight of evidence in table 4-the absence of a discernable effect on the population's composition in terms of race or education level, the relative increase in city population size and housing stock, and the relative decline in the share of old housing units-is not consistent with a simple story in which urban renewal perversely raised city-wide outcome variables through displacement of those with relatively low levels of human capital. They are, however, consistent with the operation of the alternative "renewal and growth" mechanism. In particular, higher wages, property values, and populations are consistent with higher local productivity in the Roback model.
In In a similar regression for the proportion of adults (age 25 and up) with less than four years of high school completion (rather than median schooling), we also get a small, imprecise point estimate. 27 The census did not classify housing units as "dilapidated" in 1980, but in 1950 the correlation between the percent of units dilapidated and the percent of units without full plumbing was 0.77. In results that are omitted for brevity, we find no effect on the percent of housing units that were owner-occupied.
overall effect. Rather, the point is to see whether changes in city population characteristics underpin the coefficients estimated in 
Race and Urban Renewal
Urban Renewal's Effect on Residential Segregation
It is possible that the urban renewal program had positive effects on average city-level outcomes but simultaneously had negative effects on specific population groups. African
Americans made up about 17 percent of central-city residents in 1960 (U.S. Department of Commerce 1963, p. 1), but they made up slightly more than half of the families displaced by urban renewal projects that were approved by 1966 (HUD 1966, p. 9) . Stories of predominantly black neighborhoods that were transformed or even dismantled by urban renewal are not difficult to find (Saunders and Shackelford 1998 , Carey 2001 , Schuyler 2002 , and the colloquial likening of urban renewal to "negro removal" is both evidence of and fuel for the view that the program had pronounced negative effects on African Americans.
28
Relatively early recognition of race-specific issues pertaining to urban renewal, including a hypothesized link to heightened residential segregation, appears in the 1959 Report of the U.S.
Commission on Civil Rights, which states that: "The clearance of slums occupied largely by
Negro residents and their replacement with housing accommodations beyond the means of most
Negroes gives rise to the question whether slum clearance is being used for 'Negro clearance.'
Small areas occupied by Negroes may be selected for urban renewal, forcing them to move into other areas that are predominantly Negro, thereby reinforcing or perhaps establishing for the first time strict patterns of residential segregation" (p. 488). The Report did not develop or explore evidence on the question, nor has the subsequent literature that tends to take the connection for granted and to bundle urban renewal with public housing, redlining, and various other policies in 28 Writer James Baldwin famously used the phrase "negro removal" in an interview in 1963, but the phrase predates that interview. It was used in a New York Times article about urban renewal on August 30, 1962 and in reference to the National Recovery Act in the 1930s (Arnold 1962 , Moreno 2007 ).
a broad assignment of blame for residential segregation in the post-war era. 29 The hypothesis is particularly important given evidence of the negative effects of residential segregation on African-Americans' socioeconomic outcomes (Massey and Denton 1993 , Cutler and Glaeser 1997 , Collins and Margo 2000 , Ananat 2009 ).
We investigate whether there is an empirical link between the extent of urban renewal activity and the level of residential segregation in 1980 as measured by the city-level dissimilarity index. The dissimilarity index, described by Duncan and Duncan (1955) , is widely used in quantitative studies of segregation (Massey and Denton 1995; Cutler, Glaeser, and Vigdor 1999) . It ranges between zero and one, and it can be interpreted as the proportion of the black population that would have to move to a different neighborhood in the city to achieve a balanced distribution of blacks and non-blacks across neighborhoods. We calculated segregation levels for each city using the original tract-level information for 1980 produced by the U.S.
Census (1982, Summary Tape File 3A). Table 6 reports results from three regressions estimated using the instrumental variable approach described above. The hypothesis is that higher levels of urban renewal activity between 1949 and 1974 resulted in higher levels of residential segregation at the program's conclusion, conditional on 1950 city characteristics and census-division indicators. For the full sample of 458 cities, the point estimate is negative and the standard error is relatively large; there is no statistically significant relationship between urban renewal funding and segregation.
Because relatively few cities had census tracts defined in 1950, adding a control variable for preprogram segregation sharply reduces the sample size. In column 2, we exclude the cities that have no segregation index available for 1950, but we use the same regression specification as in column 1. The coefficient changes sign but remains small and statistically insignificant. In column 3, we add the control variable for the level of residential segregation in 1950 from Cutler, Glaeser, and Vigdor (1999) . The coefficient on urban renewal funding is similar to that in column 2. In sum, the regression results do not provide support for the view that the degree of residential segregation in cities was strongly influenced by the extent of urban renewal activity, but the relatively large standard errors do not allow us to dismiss the hypothesis completely. For example, at the upper edge of the 95 percent confidence interval of column 3's regression, a $100 increase in renewal funding per capita would raise the dissimilarity index by 0.06, which is small but not trivial compared to the sample average index value of 0.74 in 1950.
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For more perspective on the potential relationship between residential segregation and urban renewal, it is useful to acknowledge two additional facts: 1) the majority of the twentiethcentury rise in urban residential segregation occurred between 1920 and 1950, before the urban renewal program started; 2) the average level of residential segregation declined between 1950
and 1980, particularly after 1970 (Cutler, Glaeser, and Vigdor 1999) . The timing of the rise and fall of residential segregation and the cross-city econometric analysis in table 6 strongly suggest that the federal urban renewal program contributed little, if anything, to the high and potentially destructive levels of residential segregation in American cities.
Urban Renewal and African Americans' Economic Outcomes
Data limitations make it difficult to study outcomes for persons who were actually displaced by urban renewal projects (Hartman 1964 , U.S. Housing and Home Finance Agency 1966). However, we can use race-specific data collected from the published census volumes to assess whether urban renewal activity had a discernable impact on the housing and labor market outcomes of black central-city residents. The regression specifications in table 7 are similar to those in tables 2 and 4, except that the outcome variables in 1980 are now specific to African
Americans. The standard errors for some of the estimates are large, but the pattern of results is consistent with earlier findings. On average, more urban renewal funding is associated with higher black-owned property values and family income, faster population growth, fewer old housing units, and (less precisely estimated) higher employment, less poverty, and fewer units with inadequate plumbing. In panel A, the point estimates are larger than the corresponding estimates from table 2. Far more detailed information would be necessary to undertake closer within-city examinations, but one could speculate that the relatively large point estimates reflect the proximity of black residents to redeveloped areas, where effects on property values and 30 In the 75 city sample, F-statistic on the excluded instrument is 2.3, but the instrument is statistically stronger when specified as the earliest or latest year of state enabling legislation (12.1 and 4.5 respectively), rather than the base coding from Aiken and Alford (1972) . In these regressions, the coefficient on urban renewal is smaller in magnitude than that in column 3 of table 6, and the upper edge of the 95 percent confidence interval is between 0.0003 and 0.0004, rather than 0.0006. employment opportunities may have been concentrated. 31 The difference also partly reflects the change in sample composition-the point estimates from table 2 rise somewhat when restricted to the set of 346 cities available in table 7's sample.
It appears that median schooling levels among African Americans tended to rise slightly with urban renewal. By itself, this does not account for the higher black income associated with urban renewal (i.e., controlling for median black education in 1980 only slightly diminishes the urban renewal coefficient in the income regression). Moreover, we think the rise in education is unlikely to reflect a simple displacement-channel story because it happened in the context of faster overall black population growth. Although the migration patterns of less-educated African
Americans cannot be evaluated with city-level census data, we assembled some information using state-of-residence and state-of-birth data from the 1980 IPUMS (5 percent sample).
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Regressing the net in-migration rate of low-education blacks on census division dummies and urban renewal funding per urban capita (state level), instrumented with the earliest or latest year of enabling legislation in that state, yields urban renewal coefficients that are positive and statistically significant. 33 That is, within census divisions, plausibly exogenous variation across states in urban renewal activity was positively correlated with in-migration by African
Americans with low education levels. This result is weakened but not overturned by controlling for state income per capita in 1949. 34 The evidence is not definitive, but it diminishes the plausibility that outmigration by less-educated African Americans accounts for table 7's results.
For another perspective, we calculated the high-education proportion of blacks residing in each state and the high-education proportion of blacks born in each state; the difference is a 31 Rossi-Hansberg et al. (2010) provide a detailed examination of recent renewal-type projects in Richmond, where the land value effects diminished with distance from the project. Collins and Smith (2007) find concentrated property value effects of riots in Cleveland. See Bartik (1991) , Bound and Holzer (2000) and Hoynes (2000) regarding the relative sensitivity of black labor market outcomes to local economic conditions. 32 We defined less-skilled black migrants in the IPUMS sample as US-born blacks, age 21 to 59, with less than 12 years of education, and with a different state-of-residence than state-of-birth. When the migrants are counted by birth-state, this gives the number of out-migrants; when counted by state-of-residence, this gives the number of in-migrants. The difference for each state is net migration, which we scale by the number of blacks who were born in the state and had less than 12 years of education. 33 Urban population in each state is from the 1950 Census of Population, volume II, part 1, table 13. The F-statistic on the excluded instrument in the state-level regressions is large (>20). 34 Without controlling for state income per capita, the coefficient on urban renewal funding is 0.009 (0.004); controlling for log 1949 income reduces the coefficient to 0.006 (0.004). Based on the 0.006 coefficient, a one-standard-deviation increase in urban renewal funding is associated with a 0.43 standarddeviation increase in the low-education immigration rate.
rough measure of how migration affected the skill mix among African Americans (e.g., 63
percent of the sample's blacks who resided in Pennsylvania had 12+ years of school, but 70 percent of blacks born in Pennsylvania had 12+ years of school; we attribute the difference to net migration). In an IV regression with census division fixed effects and log income per capita in 1949, the estimated effect of urban renewal on the migration-driven change in skill mix is small, negative, and statistically insignificant.
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This section's results suggest that urban renewal programs did not have a discernable negative impact on average black labor market outcomes or housing characteristics observed in 1980. We reiterate that the analysis here is informative about the average economic outcomes for a population group that was disproportionately affected by the program's operation, but it is not informative about the costs incurred by those who were actually displaced by urban renewal projects. We remain mindful of Paul Douglas's reflection that "The clearance of slums without the requirement for full replacement…forced poor people to carry an unfair share of the burden of rebuilding America's cities." 36 Additional research on this topic and the distributional effects of urban renewal would be valuable.
Conclusion
Title Nonetheless, the fundamental policy issues and tools associated with urban renewal remain highly relevant, and there is much to be learned about and from the extensive U.S.
experience with government-facilitated urban redevelopment. This paper provides new econometric evidence regarding the urban renewal program's effects, which appear to have been significantly more favorable than commonly portrayed, at least by some basic metrics of local economic vitality. From a city-level perspective, our estimates suggest that urban renewal led to higher median incomes and property values, faster population and housing stock growth, a lower proportion of old housing units, and (less precisely estimated) a higher employment rate, lower poverty rate, and lower proportion of housing units without full plumbing. The patterns are consistent with the program spurring more central-city growth than otherwise would have occurred, rather than simply demolishing the left-hand tail of the housing quality distribution and pushing low-earning residents out of the city. The results do not suggest that urban renewal systematically affected residential segregation levels or adversely affected African Americans' economic outcomes. However, many questions remain about the costs borne by displaced persons and businesses.
The paper's findings advance the broader understanding of the economic forces and policies that shaped American cities in the twentieth century. The urban renewal program appears to have improved city-level outcomes in certain dimensions, but of course it did not fully offset the factors that drained population and economic vitality from many cities in the period studied (see Cullen and Levitt 1999 , Baum-Snow 2007 , and Boustan 2010 . More generally, the results are consistent with studies that suggest that targeted local investments may have sizable economic impacts, perhaps due to the strength of externalities and spillovers (cf., RossiHansberg et al. 2010; Greenstone et al. 2010 ). This argument is commonly made in legal and political settings to justify local policy interventions and the use of eminent domain authority, but causal evidence supporting the claim is relatively scarce. Examining similar policies in other settings, undertaking further explorations of the causal pathways, and measuring the distributional consequences of such policies are important avenues for further research. 1949 and 1974 . Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors corrected for correlation within states are reported in parentheses. A "dilapidated" unit had "serious deficiencies, was rundown or neglected, or was of inadequate original construction, so that it did not provide adequate shelter or protection against the elements or endangered the safety of the occupants….was below the generally accepted minimum standard for housing and should be torn down or extensively repaired or rebuilt" (Bureau of Census, 1954, volume II, part 1, p. XIV) . Units without full plumbing are those without "complete plumbing for exclusive use." "Crowded" units are those with more than 1 person per room. Median property value pertains to owner-occupied housing. Summary statistics are in appendix table 1. Sources: See data appendix. Notes: Each coefficient is from a separate OLS regression of an economic outcome on years of eligibility for urban renewal (based on the timing of state enabling legislation) and control variables. Row 1's sample includes the cities examined in table 2. Rows 2 and 3 include rural counties (less than or equal to 25 percent urban population in 1950, approximately half of all U.S. counties). The underlying control variables for the city and county regressions are very similar but not exactly the same due to data availability in Haines (2004) . Differences are as follows: whereas the city regressions control for proportion of housing units built before 1920 (and counted in 1950) , the county regressions control for the proportion of units built between 1940 and 1950 (and counted in 1950) ; whereas the city regressions control separately for the proportion of units without full plumbing and the proportion of units dilapidated, the county regressions control for the proportion with full plumbing and not dilapidated (a single variable); and whereas the city regressions control for the proportion of units with more than 1 person per room, the county regressions control for median number of rooms per unit and median number of persons per unit. Standard errors are clustered by state. Sources: See data appendix. 
Tract-level Data
We calculated central city segregation levels in 1980 using data from Summary Tape File 3A of the 1980 Census of Population and Housing (ICPSR 8071). The 1950 segregation levels, which are available for relatively few cities, were originally described in Cutler, Glaeser, and Vigdor (1999) 
